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1. INTRODUCTION
On six previous occasions, the House of Lords has deliberated on  whether  a  benign  motive  can
negate liability for direct discrimination or victimisation. With the JFS  case,  the  Supreme  Court
has added a seventh, and despite nine speeches  and  a  five-four  split,  this  case  bring  us  a  step
closer to some coherent guidance on the issue. (The six previous case were: R  v  Birmingham  CC
ex p EOC [1989] 1 AC 1156; James v Eastleigh BC [1990] 2 AC 751; Nagarajan v LRT [2000]  1
AC 501; Chief Constable of West Yorks v Khan [2001] UKHL 48; Shamoon v Chief  Constable  of
the RUC [2003] ICR 337; St Helens MBC v Derbyshire [2007] ICR 841.)
The case centred on the admissions policy of an Orthodox Jewish school. In addition to the
‘benign motive’ issue, the Supreme Court addressed the meaning  of  racial  group  where  several
sub-groups are involved. For many of the speeches, the two  issues  were  intertwined.  There  was
also some discussion on the dividing line between direct and indirect discrimination.
2. FACTS AND DECISION
The Jewish Free School’s admissions policy gave preference to children  recognised  as  Orthodox
Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi (OCR), which required that the child’s mother  be  Jewish
either by matrilineal descent or by conversion under the OCR doctrine. M was  refused  admission
because he did not meet these requirements. His Italian (previously Roman Catholic)  mother  was
a Masorti Jew convert, a denomination not recognised by the OCR. His father, E,  brought  claims
of direct and indirect racial discrimination under the Education provisions of  the  Race  Relations
Act 1976 (RRA 1976), as ‘faith  schools’  enjoy  an  exemption  from  religious  discrimination  in
their admissions: Equality Act 2006, s 50. (A right  recognised  by  the  European  Convention  on
Human Rights, (1st Protocol)).
             The  High  Court  rejected  his  claim.  The  Court  of  Appeal  reversed,  holding  that  the
admissions policy amounted to direct discrimination. The Supreme Court, by 5-4  majority  (Lady
Hale, Lords Phillips, Kerr, Clarke & Mance) affirmed, although two of the minority (Lords  Hope,
Rodger, Walker, and Brown) found the  policy  indirectly  discriminated,  and  so  a  7-2  majority
found  in  favour  of  M.  (The  minority  held  that  there  was  a   prima   facie   case   of   indirect
discrimination, but only Lords Walker and Brown held that the policy was objectively justified.)
3. ISSUES
The principal difficulty in this case is that being Jewish is both a religious and a racial matter. The
principal issues were whether the admissions policy  was  religious  and/or  racial;  and  even  if  it
were facially racial, whether the religious motive behind it rendered the  ground  of  the  treatment
solely religious.
4. RACIAL GROUPS AND ETHNIC ORIGINS
Section 3 (1), RRA 1976 defines ‘racial grounds’ to mean  ‘colour,  race  nationality  or  ethnic  or
national origins’. In Mandla v Dowell Lee  [1983]  2  AC  548  (HL),  562,  Lord  Fraser  provided
guidance on the meaning of ‘ethnic origins’. It contained two ‘essential’ and five further ‘relevant’
characteristics. The essential characteristics were: (1) a long shared history, of which the  group  is
conscious as distinguishing it from other groups, and the memory of which it keeps alive;  and  (2)
a cultural tradition of its own, including family and  social  customs  and  manners,  often  but  not
necessarily  associated  with  religious  observance.  The  ‘relevant’  characteristics   were:   (1)   a
common geographical origin or descent from a small number of common ancestors; (2) a common
language, not necessarily peculiar to the group; (3) a common literature peculiar to the  group;  (4)
a common religion differing from that of  neighbouring  groups  or  from  the  general  community
surrounding it; (5) being a minority, or being an oppressed or  a  dominant  group  within  a  larger
community. Lord Fraser noted that this definition could include converts.
It is well established that Jews form a racial group by ethnic origins (ibid 563, citing King-
Ansell v Police [1979] 2 NZLR 531 (NZCA)). The JFS case was argued over the  ethnic  status  of
Jewish sub-groups.
            The JFS defence rested on identifying two Jewish groups. First, the  OCR  group.  Second,
the Mandla group which is all practising Jews, or those recognisable  by  ‘the  man  in  the  street’.
The Mandla ethnic group would exclude some with a matrilineal link to those at Mount  Sinai  but
who have long since abandoned the Jewish faith and may  even  be  unaware  of  the  genetic  link.
This is because they do not satisfy Lord Fraser’s  two  essential  characteristics.  Of  course,  these
persons fell within the OCR group. The JFS  argument  ran  that  as  the  OCR  definition  includes
persons not within the (Mandla) Jewish group, it cannot be based  on  ethnic  origins,  or  race.   It
must be solely religious ([30]-[31]).
Lord Phillips accepted the first part of this proposition but rejected its  conclusion,  noting:
‘The fallacy lies in treating current membership of a Mandla ethnic group as the exclusive  ground
of racial discrimination.’ The requirement for matrilineal descent (cases of conversion to one side)
was ‘racial, and in any event, ethnic’ ([42]). Hence, he concluded ([46]): ‘Discrimination against a
person  on  the  grounds  that  he  or  she  is,  or  is  not,  a   member   of   either   group   is   racial
discrimination.’
             Lord  Kerr  ([121])  explained  that  although  the  claimant  could  be  defined  as   Jewish
according to the Mandla criteria, ‘belonging to that group is not comprehensive  of  his  ethnicity.’
There can be ‘mixed ethnic origins that do not fall neatly into one group or  category’  and  so  the
claimant also could define his ethnic origins as a half-Italian Masorti Jew ([108]-[109]). That  was
the ground of discrimination in this case. Similarly, Lord Clarke found that identifying the ground
of treatment was not an either/or  question  (either  religion  or  ethnic).  The  definition  of  ethnic
origins was more flexible. So it was possible to discriminate on both religious and ethnic  grounds
([127]-[129]).
             Lord  Mance  suggested  that  the  Orthodox  Judaism  could  be  regarded  as   a   separate
Mandla ethnic group ([86]), but in any  case,  M  was  at  a  disadvantage  because  of  his  descent
([89]).
Lady Hale ([66]) held that ‘M was rejected because of his mother’s  ethnic  origins,  which
were Italian and Roman Catholic.’
5. COMMENT ON RACIAL GROUPS
Stripped to its bare bones, the decision means  this:  The  JFS  criteria  included  a  racial  element:
matrilineal descent from those at Mount Sinai (‘racially  Jewish’).  This  included  those  who  had
long since abandoned  the  Jewish  religion,  and  could  even  be  practising  Roman  Catholics  or
atheists.  No  matter  what  other  compensating  elements  were  provided,  this  element   directly
discriminated  on  racial  grounds.  If  the  claimant  were  racially  Jewish,  he  would  have   been
admitted. The wider comments call for some consideration.
A. Sub-Groups and Overlaps
Section 3(2) of the Act provides: ‘The fact  that  a  racial  group  comprises  two  or  more  distinct
racial groups does not prevent it from constituting a particular racial group for the purposes of this
Act.’ On the face of it, this prevents reducing each racial group  to  its  smallest  possible  number.
Thus, discrimination against ‘the Spanish’ would be actionable, even though that group comprises
Basques, Catalans, and so on. It is implicit in section 3(2) that this logic can be inversed. In Ealing
LBC v Race  Relations  Board  [1972]  AC  342  (HL)  Lord  Simon  suggested  that  within  Great
Britain, Scots, Welsh  and  English  could  each  be  defined  by  national  origins  (ibid,  363-364,
applied in Northern Joint Police Board v Power [1997]  IRLR  610  (EAT)).  On  this  basis  ‘sub-
groups’ such as Catalans, Basques, Walloons (Belgiums of French origin), Sicilians,  Bretons  and
the Cornish are definable by national or ethnic origins, and discrimination against one of these sub-
groups is actionable.
Lord Simon’s example also suggests that sub-groups can still  exist  even  if  they  overlap.
After all, the English, Welsh and Scottish certainly  overlap.  This  should  also  be  the  case  with
further sub-groups, such as the Cornish.  But,  in  the  High  Court,  Munby  J  found  ‘there  is  no
evidence ... to suggest that, for example, either Orthodox  Jews  or  Masorti  Jews  (as  opposed  to
Jews generally) have distinct ethnic origins.’ ([2008] EWHC 1535 (Admin) [166]) The  key  word
here is ‘distinct’. It means that to qualify under the Act, a racial group must have no (or very little)
overlap with any other group. In the Supreme Court,  Lord  Mance  disagreed  ([2009]  UKSC  15,
[86]): ‘That may be said to focus purely on ethnic origins in  a  way  which  the  Mandla  test  was
intended to discourage.’ Presumably, he means  that  the  Mandla  definition  of  ethnic  origins  is
more fluid than that. In any case, the majority speeches confirm that a sub-group exists  even  if  it
overlaps with other sub-groups.
The fluidity of identifying sub-groups was illustrated in the  United  States  case  Walker  v
Secretary of the Treasury 713 F Supp 403 (ND Ga 1989)  and  742  F  Supp  670  (ND  Ga  1990),
where a predominantly dark-skinned black workforce discriminated against a  light-skinned  black
colleague. The Federal District Court found that Ms Walker’s  direct  discrimination  claim  based
solely on her colour (‘light-skinned black’ being a sub-group  of,  and  overlapping  with,  ‘black’)
could succeed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964. The Court cited  Felix  v  Marquez  24
Empl Prac Dec (CCH) 279 (DDC 1980) [31], where it was  noted  that  colour  may  be  the  ‘most
practical’ claim where the victim has mixed heritage.
B. Same Group Discrimination
It follows from this that there can be liability even where  a  racial  group  discriminates  against  a
person from the same racial group. This was expressed only by Lord Clarke ([152] §i):
I do not see that the identity  of  the  discriminator  is  of  any  real  relevance  ....  There  is
certainly nothing in the language or the context of section 1 of the  Act  or  in  its  statutory
purpose to limit the section in that way.
In the United States case, Ross v Douglas County, Nebraska 234 F 3d 391 (8th Cir 2000)  a  black
supervisor called a black worker ‘black boy’ and ‘nigger’. As the treatment was on the  ground  of
the victim’s race, the supervisor was guilty of racial discrimination. And  in  Walker  Secretary  of
the Treasury (above), the ‘parent group’ discriminated against a person from a sub-group.
C. Distinguishing Ethnic and Religious Groups
The majority speeches were quite  right  to  emphasise  the  flexibility  permitted  in  identifying  a
racial group. However, in the context  of  this  religion/ethnic  debate,  they  overlooked  one  very
important point. The RRA  1976  was  not  enacted  to  prevent  religious  discrimination,  a  point
emphasised in the two speeches in Mandla (at 562  and  568).  When  holding  that  Sikhs  were  a
racial group by their ethnic origins, Lord Fraser (at 563-565) relied on a  ‘combination  of  factors’
and noted that ‘the [Sikh] community is no longer purely religious in character’. Lord Templeman
(at 569) noted that Sikhs were ‘more than a religious sect’.
The JFS majority’s emphasis on flexibility led them to go further than required  to  resolve
the  case  in  the  claimant’s  favour.  Their  speeches  suggested  Orthodox,  Masorti,  Reform,   or
Liberal, Jewish denominations could each be defined by Mandla ethnic origins. Yet, it is  difficult
to hold that these groups are defined  by  ‘a  combination  of  factors’  and  are  ‘no  longer  purely
religious in character.’ This makes it problematic for Parliament to draft an  exception  for  Jewish
(or other Faith)  Schools,  as  religion  and  ethnic  origins  have  now  become,  in  legal  language
anyway, virtually inseparable. Moreover, this  makes  it  very  difficult  for  employers  to  use  the
more liberal exceptions permitted by the Employment Equality  (Religion  or  Belief)  Regulations
2003 (SI 2003/1660), as like the JFS, they will face charges of racial  discrimination  (see  further
below).
The better view is to take the bare bones of  the  decision.  The  OCR  criteria  contained  a
racial element. The RRA 1976 only demands that the treatment is on  racial  grounds.  Thus,  it  is
not necessary for the victim to belong to a racial group, although that will often be  the  case.  It  is
enough for liability that M could not meet the racial element. The complicating factor in this  case
is that M’s essential complaint was that as a Masorti Jew  he  could  not  gain  access  to  a  Jewish
school. But this cause of action could have been brought by anyone not ‘racially Jewish’, which is
all M needed to argue.
Some support for this explanation of the decision can be  found  in  Lord  Mance’s  speech
([86]):
A test of membership of a religion that focuses on descent from a particular people is a test
based on ethnic origins. ... This case cannot therefore be  viewed  as  a  mere  disagreement
between  different  Jewish  denominations,  It  turns,  more  fundamentally,  on  whether  it
impermissible for any school to treat one child less  favourably  than  another  because  the
child does not have whatever ancestry is required ... to make the child Jewish.
Overall, the majority speeches confirm four rules about  applying  the  ‘racial  group  test’.
First, there can be sub-groups of a racial group. Second, groups or sub-groups may overlap. Third,
a sub-group  may  include  persons  not  included  in  the  parent  group,  rather  like  Basques  and
Catalans include some  non-Spanish  people  (each  group  straddles  the  Spanish-French  border).
Fourth, it makes no difference to liability if the discriminator belongs to the same  racial  group  as
the victim.
6. DIRECT DISCRIMINATION AND THE ‘BENIGN MOTIVE DEFENCE’
Section 1(1)(a), RRA 1976, provides that a person directly discriminates if ‘on  racial  grounds  he
treats that other less favourably than he treats or would treat other persons.’ The key phrase is  ‘on
racial grounds’. The next issue was, assuming that the descent requirement was racial, whether the
(benign) religious motive behind it rendered the ground of the treatment  solely  religious,  and  so
not ‘on racial grounds’.
That  a  ‘benign  motive  defence’  is  still  being  argued   is   down   to   some   apparently
contradictory statements made by our senior judges. Some twenty years ago, the  House  of  Lords
held that the ground of the treatment is discovered simply by asking  if  the  defendant  treated  the
claimant because of the protected ground, or even more simply, by asking if the  defendant  would
have treated the claimant so but for the protected ground (respectively, R v Birmingham CC,  ex  p
EOC [1989] 1 AC 1156, at 1194; James v Eastleigh BC [1990] 2 AC 751, at  774B-C).  The  point
of this approach was to avoid questions  of  defendants’  motive.  Otherwise  it  would  be  a  good
defence for an employer to show that he discriminated against a protected  group  not  because  he
intended to do so but (for example) because of customer preference, or  to  save  money,  or  avoid
controversy (R v Birmingham CC  [1989]  1  AC  1156  (HL),  at  1194,  and  see  R  v  CRE  ex  p
Westminster CC [1985] ICR 827 (CA)).
Since these  pronouncements,  a  number  of  judicial  statements  have  suggested  a  more
subjective approach. In Khan v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire  [2000]  ICR  1169  (CA)  [14],
Lord Woolf MR observed obiter: ‘To regard a person as acting unlawfully when he had  not  been
motivated either consciously or unconsciously by any  discriminatory  motive  is  hardly  likely  to
assist the objective of promoting harmonious  racial  relations.’  On  appeal,  the  House  of  Lords
appeared to agree by holding that the question was ‘subjective’ ([2001] UKHL 48, [29], [77])  and
finding no liability in a victimisation case because  the  defendant  employer  had  acted  ‘honestly
and reasonably’. (Ibid, [31]. See also [44], [59], & [80]).
 Two years later, in a case of direct sex discrimination (Shamoon v Chief Constable  of  the
RUC [2003] ICR 337) the House of Lords did not even mention R v Birmingham CC and James  v
Eastleigh.  Instead,  the  judgments  asked  why  the  claimant  was  treated  so.  What   few   other
comments  were  made  on  the  issue  suggested  that   the   finder   of   fact   should   look   for   a
discriminatory motive (ibid [55] & 116]), and that the relevant circumstances  for  the  comparison
should be those that the defendant took into account (ibid [134]),  again  pointing  to  a  subjective
approach.
The majority in JFS dealt with this apparent  confusion  by  reconciling  the  ‘but  for’  and
subjective approaches. They did so by identifying  two  types  of  direct  discrimination  ([21]-[23]
(Lord Phillips), [62]-[64] (Lady Hale), [78] (Lord Mance), [114]-[117] (Lord  Kerr),  [132]  (Lord
Clarke)). There are ‘obvious’ cases, where the reason for the  treatment  is  patently  racial  (or  on
another prohibited ground). Presumably, an example would be ‘No Blacks  need  apply’.  In  these
cases, there is no need to enquire into the defendant’s motive, no matter how worthy it might be.
Second, there are ‘less obvious’, cases. Lord Phillips provided a  vivid  example  ([21]):  A
shopkeeper says to a fat black man, ‘I do not serve people like you.’ A more realistic example was
provided by Lady Hale, where in  job  applications,  the  patent  criterion  is  ‘that  elusive  quality
known as “merit.”’ In such cases it is necessary to assess the motive of the defendant  to  ascertain
the ground of the treatment, respectively whether it was obesity or colour,  or  merit  or  race.  The
racial bias may even be subconscious, to be discovered  by  proper  inferences  from  the  evidence
([64]).
Little was said about the actual application of the but for test. (Lord Phillips ([16]) said  he
did not find the test ‘helpful’.) The focus was on what the  test  was  intended  to  avoid:  a  benign
motive defence. The majority agreed that motive was relevant only  for  the  ‘less  obvious’  cases,
but only to discover the ground of the treatment.  If  the  ground  of  the  treatment  is  unlawful,  a
benign motive cannot prevent liability. Hence, for the majority, in this ‘obvious’ case, the school’s
religious motive, no matter how worthy, did not preclude liability.
That was the technical solution of the majority. There was also a public  policy  dimension
to this case. Nearly all the judges expressed great sympathy  for  the  predicament  of  the  School,
having a definition of religion  that  included  a  racial  element.  However,  the  majority  decision
shows that even  a  powerful  religious  argument  cannot  outweigh  the  State’s  policy  on  racial
discrimination.  As  Lord  Kerr  noted  ([119]),  although  it  was  ‘logical’  to  describe  the   OCR
definition as a religious one,
when the answer to that religious question has consequences  in  the  civil  law  sphere,  its
legality falls to be examined. If the decision has consequences that are not permitted under
the law, the fact that it was taken for a religious purpose will not save it from the condition
of illegality.
Lord Clarke ([150]) used an extreme case to make the same point:
a person who honestly believed,  as  the  Dutch  Reformed  Church  of  South  Africa  until
recently believed, that God had made black people inferior and had destined  them  to  live
separately  from  whites,  would  be  able  to  discriminate  openly  against   them   without
breaking the law.
Lord Clarke cited Bob Jones University v US 461 US 574 (1983), where  the  US  Supreme  Court
upheld the IRS decision to revoke the University’s tax exempt status because it  denied  admission
to anyone engaged in interracial marriage,  despite  this  policy  being  based  on  a  sincerely  held
religious belief. He also cited Campbell and Cosans v UK (1982) 4  EHRR  293,  [36],  where  the
European Court of Human Rights stated that beliefs ‘must be worthy  of  respect  in  a  democratic
society’ and not be ‘incompatible with human dignity.’
Dissenting, Lords Hope ([201]) and Brown ([247]) in particular relied  on  the  defendant’s
motive (implementing Orthodox Jewish law) to hold the ground was solely  religious.  Lord  Hope
[197]-[199] stated that the defendant’s motive was relevant even in ‘obvious’ cases. On the  Dutch
Reformed Church  analogy,  Lord  Hope  found  this  case  ‘quite  different’  ([202]),  whilst  Lord
Brown did not consider the examples to be ‘parallel’ ([245]).
A. Comment on Direct Discrimination
(i) The Benign Motive Defence
The majority have confirmed a cardinal tenet of direct discrimination - that a benign motive  is  no
defence. But the failure of the minority  to  confirm  this,  and  the  majority’s  failure  to  overrule
Khan, still leaves some doubt over the matter. In Khan, it may  be  recalled,  the  claimant  worker
had issued proceedings for racial discrimination. In the meantime, he applied for a  job  elsewhere.
His employer refused to provide a job reference pending the outcome of the proceedings  because,
according to his legal advice, a reference might prejudice his defence at trial. The worker  brought
a secondary claim of victimisation. The  issue  was  whether  the  refusal  of  a  reference  was  ‘by
reason that’ the  worker  had  issued  the  original  proceedings.  The  House  Lords  held  that  the
employer acted ‘honestly and reasonably’ on ‘perfectly understandable’ legal advice in reaction to
the existence (lawful) - and not the bringing (unlawful) - of  the  proceedings  ([31],  [44],  [59]  &
[80].) Subsequently, in St Helens MBC v Derbyshire [2007]  ICR  841,  a  majority  of  the  House
tried to explain this case as turning on the fact that claimant had suffered no detriment. (Lady Hale
was the exception, stating ([36]) that the ‘honest and reasonable’ defence should be ‘laid to  rest’.)
But  the  majority’s  view  is  unconvincing  because  it  was   held   in   Khan   that   the   claimant
had suffered a detriment, and in any  case,  that  explanation  relied  on  the  unusual  fact  that  the
worker’s reference  would  have  been  negative,  which  would  reduce  its  value  as  a  precedent
virtually to nil. (See (2009) ILJ Vol 38(2) 149, pp 159-171.)
The point for the present purpose is that Khan reveals that the ‘ground’ or ‘reason’  for  the
treatment is a slippery issue. Was the ground the lawyer’s advice, or the bringing  of  proceedings,
or their existence, or the desire to avoid prejudicing the defence at trial? Of  course,  it  was  all  of
those things. But the exploration into the employer’s motive did not help discover a reason. It was
an exercise in semantics that provided what the House considered a just result.  The  reasons  were
obvious, and some of them were that the claimant had issued proceedings. As such, Khan does not
sit comfortably with the JFS majority’s theory that motive is only relevant in ‘less obvious’ cases.
One way to solidify the JFS majority’s  rejection  of  a  benign  motive  defence  for  direct
discrimination is to marginalise Khan to the  victimisation  cases  only.  This  argument  has  some
substance, as all cases  of  victimisation  have  to  be  poured  into  the  statutory  single  and  rigid
formula of ‘direct’  victimisation,  which  permits  no  defence.  (See  ibid,  at  174,  proposing  an
additional cause of action of ‘victimisation by proxy’, that would permit a justification defence.)
(ii) The But-For Test
None  of  the  majority  speeches  explained  quite  when  the  but  for  test  was  appropriate.  This
question was addressed more explicitly by Underhill J in the recent case of Amnesty  International
v Ahmed  [2009]  ICR  1450  (EAT).  He  stated  that  the  but  for  test  was  appropriate  for  both
‘obvious’ and ‘less obvious’ cases, although its ‘real value’ was  in  the  latter,  which  he  labelled
‘mental process’ cases. His approval was somewhat diluted by adding that ([37]):
it does not matter whether you describe the mental process  involved  as  his  intention,  his
motive, his reason, his purpose or anything else –  all  that  matters  is  that  the  proscribed
factor operated on his mind.
Underhill J further diluted its value by identifying a third category of direct  discrimination  where
the but for test would be ‘misleading’ ([37]). These could  be  conveniently  labelled  ‘background
cases’.  For  instance,  in  Martin  v  Lancehawk  UKEAT/0525/03  a   (male)   managing   director
dismissed a (female) worker when their affair came to an end. Of course, but for her sex the  affair
would never have occurred and she would not have been dismissed. The EAT held, however,  that
she was dismissed because of the  ‘breakdown  of  the  relationship’  and  not  because  she  was  a
woman.  Thus,  where  the  discriminatory  elements  merely  form  the  background   to   the   less
favourable treatment, the but for test should not be used.
Although the majority in JFS cited the but for cases with  approval,  their  failure  to  show
when it should be used did little to recommend it as the template  for  tribunals.  Coupled  with  its
unsuitability for the ‘background’ cases, there is very little left to endorse the but  for  test.  (For  a
further criticism of the but  for  test  for  mixed  motive  cases,  see  US  Supreme  Court  in  Price
Waterhouse v Hopkins 490 US 228 (1989), at 241.)
B. The Test for Direct Discrimination
It would seem that the best guide for tribunals now is to ask first  if  the  case  is  either  ‘obvious’,
‘less obvious’, or ‘background’. In the obvious cases, no further inquiry  should  be  necessary,  in
the other two cases, tribunals should  explore  the  defendant’s  motive,  but  only  to  discover  the
ground of the treatment.
Bearing mind Lord Nicholls’ caution in Nagarajan (at 512), that ‘Many people are unable,
or unwilling, to admit even to themselves that actions  of  theirs  may  be  racially  motivated’,  the
enquiry is not necessarily  one  in  search  of  a  conscious  hostile  racial  motive.  (See  also  Lord
Browne-Wilkinson, Glasgow CC v Zafar, [1998] ICR 120 (HL),  at  126.)  Hostile  motive  is  not
necessary for liability. And so the meaning of ‘motive’ in this context requires some definition.  In
short, it means simply the ground (or one of the grounds) of the treatment. This is  well  illustrated
by King v Great Britain-China Centre [1992] ICR  516  (CA).  Ms  King,  who  was  Chinese  but
educated in Britain, applied for a post at the China Centre,  an  organisation  established  to  foster
closer  ties  with  China.  She  met  the  requirements  of  fluent  spoken  Chinese  and  a   personal
knowledge of China. A white English person was appointed. The circumstantial evidence was that
none of the five Chinese applicants made  the  short  list  of  eight  white  candidates,  and  that  no
Chinese person had ever been employed in the centre. The Court of Appeal held that the industrial
tribunal was entitled to draw the conclusion that King was discriminated against  because  she  did
not come from the ‘same, essentially British, academic background’  as  the  existing  staff.  There
was no need to prove the defendant acted upon a hostile or conscious racial motive,  only  that  the
ground of the rejection was racial. Thus, using the defendant’s motive for liability need not be  the
limiting factor, so long as it not used  to  bypass  the  ground  of  the  treatment  to  find  a  ‘benign
motive defence’.
7. INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION
After rejecting the claim of direct discrimination, the minority treated this as a case of prima  facie
indirect discrimination, with Lords Hope and Rodger  holding  that  School  could  not  justify  the
admissions policy. In essence, the minority judgments conflated the  motive  and  group  issues  to
show that the Chief Rabbi’s purely religious motive  meant  that  the  only  group  distinction  was
religious, and not ethnic. The flaw in that reasoning is best illustrated by an example used by Lord
Hope ([203]). He compared how the OCR treated a) a secular descendant of an  orthodox  convert,
and b) a practising descendant of a non-orthodox convert, in order to show  that  the  OCR  motive
was purely religious, on the basis that the  secular  descendant  would  be  admitted.  The  example
shows how the minority arguments missed the point. The ‘convert rule’ is merely the hurdle faced
by those not racially Jewish. It is not the challenged rule. The challenged rule is the one  that  says
if you are not racially Jewish you must pass the ‘convert’ test. With the challenged  rule  in  mind,
the comparison should be between the treatment given to a racially Jewish child and that to a non-
racially Jewish child. One gains automatic admission, the other faces a further test.
Thus, the minority’s reasoning, that the OCR rule was (on racial grounds) facially  neutral,
led them to treat this as  a  case  indirect  discrimination.  However,  that  some  of  the  claimant’s
ethnic group were not disadvantaged by the admissions policy does not automatically prevent  this
being a case of direct discrimination. It is perfectly possible  to  directly  discriminate  against  just
some members of a protected class. Lady Hale addressed this point ([66]):
M was rejected because of his mother’s ethnic  origins  ...  The  fact  that  the  OCR  would
have over-looked his mother’s Italian origins, had she converted to Judaism in a procedure
which they would recognise, makes no difference to this fundamental fact.
Lord Mance made the same point  ([89]):  ‘[A]n  organisation  which  admitted  all  men  but  only
women graduates would be engaged in direct discrimination on the grounds of sex.’
8. RELEVANCE OF THE DECISION FOR EMPLOYERS
As  noted  earlier,  the  wider  range  of  defences  for  religious  preferences  throws  up  a  similar
problem for employers as that faced by the JFS. The Religion or Belief Regulations 2003  provide
three exemptions for direct religious discrimination. First, for any employer, the standard Genuine
Occupational Requirement  (GOR),  where  the  worker’s  religion  or  belief  must  be  a  genuine,
determining,  and  legitimate  requirement  for  the  job;  in  addition  the  requirement  should   be
proportionate (reg 7(2)).  The  second  exemption  is  for  organisations  with  an  ethos  based  on
religion or belief. The characteristic must be a requirement for the job, but not a  determining  (i.e.
decisive) one, having regard to the organisation’s ethos (reg 7(3)). Third, ‘schools with a religious
character’  may  favour  teachers  of  the  school’s  religion  (reg  39,  see  School   Standards   and
Framework Act 1998, ss 58-60; Education (Scotland) Act 1980, s 21). Under the RRA  1976  (and
proposed in the Equality Bill 2009), the only employment  exception  for  direct  discrimination  is
the standard race GOR.
An employer wishing to employ someone  Jewish  for  religious  reasons  runs  the  risk  of
directly discriminating on racial grounds, and so would have to frame  its  requirement  within  the
race GOR, which is likely to be more difficult, or even impossible (there is some  doubt  as  to  the
status of the race GOR, see Amnesty Int v Ahmed [2009] IRLR 884 (EAT), [59]).
The obvious answer, it seems, is to remove the racial criterion  from  the  requirement  and
frame the requirement in purely religious terms, confining it to practising Jews (suggested  by  the
Court of Appeal [2009] EWCA Civ 626, [33]). The problem with this group – in light of  the  JFS
majority speeches - is that it appears to coincide with the Mandla  definition,  which  again  would
invite claims of racial discrimination. As noted above, the better view  is  to  reduce  the  majority
decision to the racial strand of the OCR criteria, and then focus  on  the  Mandla  speeches,  which
clearly distinguished religion per se from ethnic origins.
9. CONCLUSION
As noted  above,  the  obvious  difficulty  in  this  case  was  that  the  OCR’s  definition  straddles
religious and racial factors. However, it was not that difficult to unravel the  two  and  identify  the
racial strand. It is a pity that it has taken 610 paragraphs, 11 judicial  speeches,  and  13  judges  to
achieve the correct result, and even that carried some problematic reasoning. This is on top  of  six
previous House of Lords cases on the ‘benign motive’ issue for  discrimination  and  victimisation
and undermines any confidence that this decision will stand as a  seminal  one.  Ideally,  tribunals,
employers and workers would have preferred one leading speech providing clear guidance.
What the majority speeches do say is that for direct discrimination at least: (1) there  is  no
benign motive defence, (2) the defendant’s motive is relevant only in ‘less obvious’ cases,  (3)  the
only purpose of identifying the  motive  is  to  discover  the  ground  of  the  treatment.  For  racial
discrimination, racial groups may be formed of sub-groups which may overlap, and  even  contain
persons not in the ‘parent’ group. Finally, it is possible to for one member of a protected  group  to
directly discriminate against a member of the  same  group,  or  against  just  some  members  of  a
protected group.
